Complex networks often have a modular structure, where a number of tightlyconnected groups of nodes (modules) have relatively few interconnections. Modularity had been shown to have an important effect on the evolution and stability of biological networks [1] , on the scalability and efficiency of large-scale infrastructure [2, 3] , and the development of economic and social systems [4, 5] . An analytical framework for understanding modularity and its effects on network vulnerability is still missing. Through recent advances in the understanding of multilayer networks [6] [7] [8] , however, it is now possible to develop a theoretical framework to systematically study this critical issue. Here we study, analytically and numerically, the resilience of modular networks under attacks on interconnected nodes, which exhibit high betweenness values [9, 10] and are often more exposed to failure [3, [11] [12] [13] . Our model provides new understandings into the feedback between structure and function in real world systems, and consequently has important implications as diverse as developing efficient immunization strategies, designing robust large-scale infrastructure, and understanding brain function.
Network science has become a leading approach to the study of emergent collective phenomena in complex systems, with a wide range of applications to fundamental real word systems [14] . Many real world systems have been shown to exhibit a modular structure, in which smaller clusters of nodes are connected more to each other than to the network at large, which is key to their behavior and functioning [15] [16] [17] [18] . For example, recent studies of biological networks show that the deletion of nodes connecting between modules can have a deleterious effect on the network integrity [19] , efficiency [20] , and stability [21] . Here we provide an analytical framework for studying the robustness of modular networks in the presence of attacks on interconnected nodes. We study a percolation process on networks consisting of a varying number of modules, m, and a varying number of interconnected nodes. The analytical solution reveals two percolation regimes separated by a critical number of modules m * : for m < m * one needs to remove all interconnected nodes to break the system, while the modules are almost unaffected internally. In contrast, for m > m * one needs to remove only a fraction of the interconnected nodes, before the system collapses.
This is due to the fact that for m > m * the number of interconnected nodes is high and partial removal of these breaks the modules internally, which helps to bring about the rapid collapse of the whole system. Our approach can also be used to study analytically attacks on high betweenness centrality nodes, which in modular structures, correspond to interconnected nodes. Such attacks, which have only been studied numerically so far, are considered to be among the most harmful attack strategies [9, 10] .
We consider a modular network with N nodes divided into m equal sized modules. Similarly to [16] , we define p in as the probability to connect nodes in the same module and p out as the probability to connect nodes in different modules. Thus, the total number of intra-module (inter-module) links is given by the probability for a link p in (p out ) multiplied by the number of possible links yielding
We define α to be the ratio between the probabilities for an intra-and inter-module link
In Fig. 1(a) -(c) we present an example of modular networks generated with different values of α, and visualized using force-directed layout, which has been shown to demonstrate network modularity [22] . Note that the ratio between the number of inter-modules links and intramodule links depends not only on α, but also on the number of modules
Thus, our model is taking into consideration that systems comprised of more modules have more inter-links, as illustrated in Fig. 1(d) . See also Supplementary Fig. S1 , where we show the increase of the mean inter-degree as a function of m.
Given the model described above for generating random modular networks, we proceed to study percolation properties for such networks. We consider a modular Erdős-Rényi (ER) network [23, 24] where both the intra-and inter-connectivity are Poisson distributed with means k intra and k inter respectively. Using the generating function approach presented in [8] (see full details in the Supplementary Information), we find that in the presence of random nodes failure, the giant component emerges when the following is satisfied
This condition yields k = k intra + k inter = 1 for every m, recovering the standard result for single networks without communities. Thus, in the case of random node failure the percolation threshold only depends on the mean degree, k.
However, in real systems the interconnected nodes are often more exposed to failure than other nodes. For example, it has been shown that aging and schizophrenia could result in damage to the interconnected nodes in brain networks [12, 13] . In addition, it is often the case that interconnected nodes are considered to be important; for example, the New York City and London airports, which provide an attractive target for attacks [3] . Therefore, in the following, we consider an attack on modular ER networks where the interconnected nodes are randomly removed. Let r i (k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k m ) be the occupation probability of a node from module i with k 1 links in module 1, k 2 links in module 2 and etc. When the interconnected nodes are randomly removed, this probability is given by
where q is the probability that a randomly chosen interconnected node is occupied. Let p be the general occupation probability, i.e. the probability that a randomly chosen node is occupied. Since the probability for a node to be interconnected is 1 − e −k inter , i.e. one minus a Poisson distribution with mean k inter at 0, we obtain
We extend Callaway et al.'s approach [25] for studying the robustness of networks to intentional attacks, from single-module networks to modular networks in a similar approach as in [8] (see full details in the Methods section), and solve for the occupation probability given in (6), obtaining two possible solutions for the critical occupation probability of interconnected nodes
where
From these solutions, we obtain the critical occupation probability p c , using Eq. (7).
Due to symmetry, once the giant component emerges (p > p c ) the fraction of nodes of module i in the giant component equals to the total fraction of nodes in the giant component, S i = S, and one obtains,
For k intra = 0, only a fraction q of the nodes in the network are connected, and one obtains S = q(1 − e −kS ), recovering the standard result for percolation in single networks [23, 24] .
In Fig. 2 , we confirm our analytical solution (Eqs. (8)- (10)) by extensive numerical simulation of ER modular networks of size N = 600 000. First, we show the percolation threshold as a function of the number of modules m where the mean degree is kept fixed k = 4 and α = 100, see Fig. 2(a) . Similar results are shown for α = 10, and 1000 in Supplementary   Fig. S2 . Let m * be the transition point where the two analytical solutions cross each other.
In the regime where m < m * the attack on interconnected nodes mainly breaks the connectivity between the modules leaving their internal structure intact. Thus, only the removal of all the interconnected nodes (q c = 0) breaks down the giant component.
In order to illustrate this effect, in Fig. 3 we visualize the giant component at S = 0.1 (close to total collapse) with interconnected nodes shown in black and all other nodes colored according to the module they belong to. For a network with m = 4 < m * , random node failure destroys the internal structure of the modules evenly, see Fig. 3 Fig. S11 ), and thus, our framework also provides an analytical tool of studying attacks on high betweenness centrality nodes, where only numerical simulations currently exist that suggest such an attack is one of the most harmful attack strategies [9, 10] . Figure S11 compares the betweenness centrality of nodes with inter-module connections (called internodes) and nodes with only intra-module connections (called intra-nodes) for networks of size N = 100 000 with m = 10 modules. First, we show that the average betweenness centrality of interconnected nodes is significantly higher than for nodes without interconnections in networks with mean intra-degree k intra = 2 and a varying number of interconnections, see Fig. S11(a) . Then, for k inter = 2, we show that the betweenness centrality distribution of interconnected nodes has a broader tail, meaning that interconnected nodes are much more likely to have high betweenness centrality. In Supplementary Fig. S7 we obtain similar results in networks with k = 4 and different values of α. Thus, our analytical results of attack on interconnected nodes can be regarded as a theory for attacking high betweenness nodes.
Our analytical and numerical investigation of the effect of modularity on network stability has important implications for real world networks, such as cognitive and neural brain networks. The modular architecture of neural structural and functional networks is considered a fundamental principle of the brain [26] . This non-random modular architecture is crucial for the brain's functional demands of segregation and integration of information [27] . In fact, disrupted brain modular organization is related to neuropathology, such as schizophrenia [28] , autism [29] , Alzheimer's [30] and impulsivity [31] . Nevertheless, research investigating any possible negative aspects of modular organization in brain networks is lacking. At the cognitive level (the level of information processing in the brain), network analysis is mainly focused on language and memory networks [32] . Yet, knowledge on modular effect and importance in cognitive network organization is limited. Recently, the semantic memory organization of persons with Asperger syndrome was compared to that of neurotypical controls using network analysis [33] . This research found that the semantic memory network of persons with Asperger syndrome is more modular than that of neurotypical matched controls. The authors suggest that this "hyper-modularity" is related to the Asperger syndrome rigidity of thought, e.g. difficulty in comprehending high level aspects of language. Thus, modular organization can have a negative effect on real world networks by leading to rigidity of the network which might hinder proper network function.
Finally, our study offers an efficient immunization approach in modular networks, where epidemic spreading can be prevented at a lower cost by immunizing interconnected nodes.
For both regimes, below and above m * , the percolation threshold obtained from attacking the interconnected nodes is higher than the case of random failure and therefore immunization of these nodes is more effective. For the regime m < m * , this can be done at a very low cost as the percolation threshold is very high. Thus, in geographically distant social networks, it is worth vaccinating people that link between different communities such as businessmen traveling a lot between countries.
METHODS
We give a brief derivation of our analytical solution (Eqs. (8)- (10)). We extend Callaway et al.'s approach [25] for studying the robustness of networks to intentional attacks, from single-module networks to modular networks in a similar manner that was done in [8] . We define the generating functions for the degree and excess degree distributions of occupied nodes
where p i k 1 ,k 2 ,...,km is the probability that a node from module i has degree (k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k m ), q ij k 1 ,k 2 ,...,km is the probability of following a randomly chosen ij-edge to a node with excess degree (k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k m ) , and r i k 1 ,k 2 ,...,km is the occupation probability of a node with degree (k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k m ) defined in (6) . By substituting (6) into (11)- (12), in the case of modular ER networks with average intra-and inter-degree k intra , k inter respectively, we obtain
where x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) and G i (x) is the generating function of the degree distribution, see Supplementary Information. We define the generating function for the distribution of the number of occupied nodes in the component reachable by following a randomly chosen ij-edge to a i-node and then following its additional outgoing links
And similarly, the distribution of the number of nodes reachable from a randomly chosen i-node (rather than ij-edge) is generated by
Then, the average number of occupant j-nodes in the component of a randomly chosen i-node, is given by
Solving the system (17), see full details in the Supplementary Information, we obtain the critical occupation probability of interconnected nodes in which the average component size diverges, given in Eqs. (8)- (9) . Finally, once the giant component emerges (p > p c ), the fraction of i-nodes belonging to the giant component, S i , is given by
where u ji = 1 − S j , yielding Eq. (10). 
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II. ANALYTICAL SOLUTION A. Random failure
First, we give full derivation of Eq. (5) in the main text. The generating function for the degree and excess degree distribution (see [1] ) of modular ER networks with average intraand inter-degree k intra , k inter respectively is given by
where x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ). Then from [1] , the average number of j-nodes in the component of a randomly chosen i-node is given by
where δ ij denotes the Kronecker delta and
For example, using the notation h i = ∂H i ∂x 1
(1), the system obtained for s 1 1 is:
. . .
Summing equations for h 2 , . . . h m , we obtain:
Substituting into (S5), we obtain:
This is also where all h i diverges, yielding Eq. (5) in the main text.
B. Attack on interconnected nodes
In the case of attack on interconnected nodes, the average number of j-nodes in the component of a randomly chosen i-node is given by
For example, using the notation j ij = ∂J ij ∂x 1
Since F 1 (1) = F i (1) = e −k inter (1 − q) + q for all i, we can sum all equations for j ii obtaining:
Summing for all equations j il for i = l we obtain
And by substituting (S12) into (S11), we obtain
leading to the critical occupation probability of interconnected nodes (in which the average component size diverges) given in Eqs. (8)- (9) in the main text. to the random attack, because it contains subgraphs (i.e. modules) with more complete internal structure. As m increases, the difference in sizes disappears. 
III. MODEL FOR GENERATING RANDOM MODULAR NETWORKS
